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SO MUCH TO REWRITE, SO LITTLE
TIME . . . .
Sanford Levinson*
Like other participants in this symposium, I’ve been
charged with answering the following question: “If you were
rewriting the U.S. Constitution, what would it say?” I am faced
with a dilemma: I have written a book, Our Undemocratic
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
1
the People Can Correct It), outlining my many criticisms of the
Constitution, and nothing in the now-almost-five years since
original publication has diminished my belief that the
Constitution imposes on us a dangerously dysfunctional political
order that presents a clear and present danger to our collective
future. If anything, as my language may suggest to some readers,
my loss of “faith” in the Constitution has become ever stronger,
and I, therefore, have become something of a crank on the point.
I have also become somewhat crankish regarding what our
students learn from us about constitutions in the United States. I
think we in the legal academy (and I use the personal pronoun
advisedly) generally do a dreadful job of teaching American
constitutionalism to our students because we have reduced that
subject almost exclusively to a set of issues that are (or have
been) litigated before the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, we systematically ignore the fact that all Americans,
other than those living in the District of Columbia, live under
2
two constitutions, not only the national constitution. State
constitutions, to put it mildly, have their own interest for anyone
interested in comparative constitutionalism, ranging from
interestingly different ways of organizing basic institutions—e.g.,

* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
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1. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
2. See Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State
Constitutions for our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 575 (2011).
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the predominance of decidedly non-unitary executives in the
states or elected judiciaries—to the presence of guarantees of
3
“positive rights.” Most important, in many ways, is the rejection
in almost all the states of the Founders’ antipathy to even a hint
of direct democracy.
All of those issues should be brought to our students’
attention in ways that I fear is not now the case. I have argued
elsewhere that there is no real justification for the common
practice in American law schools of requiring students to take
constitutional law unless it is to prepare them to be better
citizens and potential civic leaders. It is quite unlikely that their
legal practices will ever involve constitutional law (save for those
students who go into the practice of criminal law and therefore
must know the constitutional aspects of criminal procedure, a
topic that is almost universally not covered in the required
4
courses). As citizens—and, even more, as potential leaders—our
students should be informed that the Constitution is, for better,
and I think, very much for worse, far more than what is
commonly presented in their law school courses.
When talking in October 2010 with a group of Chinese
students visiting Harvard, I somewhat surprised them by
suggesting that the main thing that foreign students (and
constitutional drafters) can learn from the United States is what
not to do. What might be genuinely attractive about the
Constitution, including its protection of certain rights, can be
found, in the modern world, in almost all constitutions, not to
mention the fact that most modern constitutions also include
guarantees of positive rights that are left unmentioned in the
national constitution (though not, as already noted, in American
state constitutions). Indeed, almost no modern country has
looked to the United States for inspiration; for altogether good
reason, constitution drafters abroad are far more likely to look
at France, Germany, Canada, Spain, and, since 1996, South
Africa. There have, to be sure, been some desirable amendments
to the Constitution since 1788, but, frankly, none of them comes
close to curing the basic structural failures of the original
document, what I have come to call the “hard-wired” features
that most professors never bother discussing with their students
because they are never subject to litigation. These include, but
3. See Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”: A View from
American States, 57 KAN. L. REV. 791 (2011).
4. Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the United States Constitution:
Competing Narratives of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L.J. 1337 (2009).
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are not limited to, bicameralism—including the particularity that
each house has a death-dealing veto over legislation passed in
the other house; the presidential veto that, because of its
onerous requirements for override, turns us functionally into a
tricameral political system; the fixed presidential term; and an
amendment procedure that establishes the U.S. Constitution as
the hardest-to-amend in the entire world (in marked contrast, I
5
should note, to almost all American state constitutions). These
structures have become the unchallengeable—because so
thoughtlessly accepted—ground against which we attempt to
paint our political futures.
As I wrote in my book, Madisonian “veneration” has
6
triumphed with a vengeance, so much so that we reject the
much wiser Madisonian imperative, set out most eloquently in
7
Federalist 14, to learn from the lessons of experience or, if one
prefers Hamilton, to accept the duty, as he set out in the very
first Federalist, to engage in “reflection and choice” when
8
deciding how we want to organize our political lives. Instead, we
are living in an ultra-Burkean society that often seems to be
organized around a truly remarkable kind of ancestor worship—
extending well beyond the persons of the ancestors to the
handiwork they created—that would amaze any anthropologists
stumbling upon it in what used to be called a “primitive” society.
Both masses—think only of the Tea Party—and elites seem to
unite around the notion that we are lucky to have the
Constitution we do, even if, needless to say, there is often bitter
conflict about exactly what it means. My own emphasis on the
“hard-wired” Constitution, incidentally, allows me to forego
almost all “interpretive” disputes, since there is no serious
argument about the “meaning” of most of these particular
provisions, even if, as I want to suggest, there should be far more
concern than is common expressed about their wisdom.

5. See Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 237, 261 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (noting that at the time, the United
States came in second in degree of difficulty to the Yugoslav Constitution, which, of
course, is no longer operative).
6. LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 16–19. See also Sanford Levinson, “Veneration” and
Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional
Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 2443 (1990).
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/histdox/fedpapers.html.
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.
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The Chinese students asked me if there is any feature of the
original Constitution that I admire, and I quickly answered “the
Preamble,” which does indeed set out a thoroughly admirable
set of ends to which we should be devoted as a polity. The
problem is that what comes after the Preamble has made it
remarkably difficult to actually attain those ends. I am
exempting from my critique “assignments of power,” as in
Article 1, Section 8, or “limitations on power,” as in Article I,
Sections 9 or 10, or, of course, the Bill of Rights. As Madison
9
suggested, these are by and large “parchment barriers” that
explain relatively little about the ensuing history of American
constitutional development. This may well be true as well of the
“Reconstruction Amendments,” which utterly failed for almost a
full century to bring about the “regime change” that was so
necessary (and altogether proper) following the catastrophe in
which 600,000 Americans died for what Lincoln (with somewhat
limited accuracy) called a “new birth of freedom.” Instead, the
“slavery bonus” of the 3/5 compromise in the 1787 Constitution
was succeeded by an even more ample “segregation bonus” in
which the former slaves now counted as full human beings for
purposes of representation, but rarely, whatever the 15th
Amendment might suggest to the contrary, were allowed to vote.
The Constitution is surely better with those Amendments than
without, but no one should overestimate their empirical
importance in actually explaining the contours of American
history. One can scarcely describe as a “parchment barrier,”
however, Article I, Section 3, which establishes the Senate and
its absolutely egregious assignment of equal voting power to
each state. It has had immeasurably more impact on our polity
than, say, the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a result of returning to undergraduate teaching and
preparing lectures for undergraduate courses at the University of
Texas and Harvard, I am currently writing a book that will
constitute a very extensive response to Professor Hasday’s
question. Even then, however, I will refrain from offering a full
answer inasmuch as I continue very strongly to believe that a
new constitutional convention is badly needed, and that,
inevitably, what would come out of such a convention would
reflect both changes of mind on the part of participants after
deliberative discussion as well as necessary compromises

9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.
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resulting from hard bargaining among conflicting groups. The
one thing I am absolutely confident of is that no one will appoint
me to be the sole rewriter of our very defective Constitution.
So the question for me is to have a rough rank order of
deficiencies, which, almost by definition, also establishes
potential items for compromise. Thus, for example, I strongly
believe that life tenure for Supreme Court justices is an idea
11
whose time has long gone. There are several rationales, all of
them favoring limits: a) the simple need for new blood and new
ideas; b) the unfortunate fact that many justices over our history,
including, most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist, have simply
been unable to exercise self-discipline and to retire when faced
with debilitating illness at an old age; or c) the unseemly
spectacle of justices “hanging on” until a president is elected
from their own party who can therefore name a politically
congruent successor. I would therefore certainly rewrite the
Constitution to get rid of life tenure and substitute in its stead
single 18-year terms, with no possibility of reappointment.
Because of the contingency that we have a nine-person supreme
court, such a system would create vacancies every two years and
make it impossible for even a two-term president to name a
majority of its membership. A political party would have to be
successful in three consecutive presidential elections (as well, of
course, as control the Senate) in order to capture the Court. But
I do not, by any means, believe that this is the worst feature of
our Constitution; indeed, I’d be a far happier person if I thought
that were the case. So if proponents of life tenure, however
mistaken, were to offer a deal by which I would drop my
opposition to continuing that practice in return for their
agreeing, say, to adopt new principles of representation in the
Senate or to eliminate the electoral college, I’d accept the deal in
a nano-second.
So let me suggest, very briefly, what I currently believe are
some of the most awful features of a generally defective
Constitution very much in need of rewriting. I do not mean to
rank order them; indeed, on different days, and different
political contexts, I would rank them differently. I am confident,
though, that any serious discussion of the Constitution and its
potential rewriting would have to grapple (at least) with these:
10. See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821
(2011).
11. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES (Paul Carrington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2006).
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1. Equal representation in the Senate. Even those who
generally like the Senate are hard pressed to offer any
cogent defense for the principle, given that it is in the
original Constitution only because Madison and others
who were correctly revolted by the idea decided to
submit to the extortionate demands of Delaware and
other small states rather than risk the collapse of the
constitution-drafting enterprise itself. The “principle” of
equal representation has no more respectable a pedigree
than do the various compromises with slave interests. All
were arguably “necessary” (I dare not say “proper”) in
order to achieve the over-riding aim of achieving
national unity and preventing the collapse of the United
States into three separate countries along the Atlantic
coast. Thus, Madison refers in Federalist 62 to the
principle of equal representation as a “lesser evil” and
offers nothing further by way of a defense. Successor
generations are in no way required to feel even a scintilla
of obligation to adhere to such compromises once the
objective situation makes that no longer “necessary.”
Were Delaware and other small states to threaten,
during the next constitutional convention, to secede, let
them. Why exactly should we care, unlike the situation in
1787, when the loss of Delaware and other small states
would have been catastrophic? The fact is, of course, that
Delaware and other similar states—Alaska may be an
exception—could not offer a credible threat to secede. If
truth be known, they would be lucky to preserve their
statehood at all.
2. But one shouldn’t stop with making the allocation of
power in the Senate more proportional. The fact is that
there is no good reason for the Senate to be organized
along state geographical lines at all. That’s what the
House of Representatives is for. One of the truly
dreadful features of the American system of government
is that no one other than Presidents (and, because of the
electoral college, this is only partially true even of them),
has any genuine incentive to think in terms of what
Madison and others imbued with the ideology of civic
republicanism referred to as the “common interest” or
“national good.” Both Houses of Congress are full of
dedicated anti-cosmopolitans who organize their political
lives around pandering to their extremely limited

!!!LEVINSON-273-SOMUCHTOREWRITE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

SO MUCH TO REWRITE

11/17/2011 2:29 PM

521

constituencies. (See, for example, former South Dakota
Sen. Tom Daschle’s faithful service to Citicorp, which
brilliantly relocated its Citicard operations to that state
and therefore in effect bought a senator as well as
cheaper labor. It was Daschle who helped shepherd
through the Senate the truly awful bankruptcy bill that is
causing grief to many Americans today.) I have no
objection to one House being organized on such a
principle, even if Madison might rightly have viewed this
as a capitulation to a politics of “faction,” but there is no
reason for doing that with both.
The Senate, if it survives—and I do believe that the
United States is much too large to function with only one
legislative body and the inevitable distortions that a
single house brings—should be composed of members
elected from entirely different constituencies. There
could, for example, be nationwide elections based on
proportional representation by party, which would assure
that dispersed groups (who, ironically, may be worse off
than “discrete and insular minorities” who congregate in
particular areas) might actually be able to gain
representation that an exclusively geographical principle
of selection now makes near impossible. This could easily
generate several new parties, which itself would be a
benefit. There is no reason to believe that the two-party
duopoly, itself partly a creation of the particular
structures created by the Constitution, has served the
country particularly well. Many countries around the
world function quite well with multi-party systems. To be
sure, this would, by definition, increase the probability
that an occasional “extreme” party could in fact be
represented, but this would, I believe, be a relatively
cheap price to pay in return for the added representation
of many groups who are marginalized by the vagaries of
an exclusively geographically-oriented system of
representation. Australia, for example, organizes its
Senate on the same principle of equal representation as
ours, but the twelve state senators are elected on the
basis of proportional representation, which, as one would
predict, produces greater diversity in the Australian
senate than the single-member district Australian House.
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12

As Virginia professor Larry Sabato has suggested, one
might also make ex officio senators of all former
presidents and vice-presidents, retired members of the
Supreme Court, former heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
former heads of the Federal Reserve, and the like, in
order to provide important perspectives that are likely to
be lacking.
3. My rewritten Constitution might well dispense with the
President in favor of a parliamentary system, though I
confess that I do not have settled views on this. One of
the reasons I support a convention is that I would very
much want to hear what people have to say, since there
are obvious strengths and weaknesses in both
presidential and parliamentary systems. Moreover, one
must be careful to recognize that there are in fact
varieties of each system, so that it is a fundamental error
to essentialize either of them. The character of a given
presidential system may depend importantly on the
extent to which the chief executive is, for example, able
to appoint all members of the executive branch (unlike,
say, forty-eight of the fifty governors in the United
States, who participate in decidedly non-unitary
13
executive branches); whether the president has a veto
power that can be relatively easily overridden by the
legislature; the particular term of office enjoyed by the
chief executive; or, whatever the length of the term,
whether the President is allowed to run for repeated reelection. I am confident, though, that any acceptable
presidential system within the United States must have a
procedure for a solemn vote of “no confidence,” by, say,
2/3 of Congress meeting together as a single body,
presumably reflecting the basic loss of faith in the
President’s judgment and capacity for minimally wise
decisions. (I would not rule out adoption of a directdemocracy “recall” system.) In the modern world, it is
dreadfully fallacious to believe that we can blithely put
up with an incompetent president for a substantial
amount of time until the next election. It is not only that
our enemies are always looking for weaknesses; it is also
that great structural forces, whether one thinks of the
12. See LARRY SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: 23 PROPOSALS TO
REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY (2007).
13. See Jacob Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301 (2010).
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globalized economy, natural disasters, or public health
emergencies, may call for highly freighted decisions, and,
to put it mildly, the public is entitled to have in office
someone in whom they (or at least 1/3+1) feel a requisite
degree of confidence.
4. If we retained a presidential system, my rewritten
constitution would have a very different inauguration
day, very much closer to the election itself. It is vitally
important that we have, as much as possible, a
government that combines legal authority with political
legitimacy. Our hiatus between election and inauguration
guarantees that with some frequency we lack this most
elemental political good. Of course, any significant
moving up of inauguration day would ultimately require
getting rid of the electoral college, but that’s a feature,
not a bug.
Even if we retrain the dreadful electoral college,
though, surely we would want to change the consequence
of an electoral college deadlock (i.e., the failure of a
candidate to gain a majority of electoral votes), which is
to have the House of Representatives make the choice
from the top three candidates on a one state/one vote
basis. In debating the electoral college over the years, I
have not yet found anyone who is willing to defend this
14
aspect of the “electoral college system.” Usually the
response is something to the effect that “it hasn’t
happened since 1824” and, therefore, won’t happen
again. To put it mildly, this is an unconvincing argument,
not least because the shifts of a relatively small number
of votes in both 1948 and 1968, when Strom Thurmond
and George Wallace, respectively, won 39 and 47
electoral votes, might well have required the House to
choose between Truman and Dewey or Nixon and
Humphrey (since it is inconceivable that they would have
chosen Thurmond or Wallace). Surely the events of the
past several years, whether one thinks of force-five
hurricanes hitting major American cities or the nearcollapse of the world economic order, should make us
14. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, John McGinnis & Dan Lowenstein, Debate, Should
we Dispense with the Electoral College?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 10 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=8 (showing that neither Professor
McGinnis nor Professor Lowenstein was willing to defend the “electoral college system”
in its totality).
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skeptical of “since the odds are low, we shouldn’t worry
at all” forms of argument.
5. My rewritten Constitution would eliminate what George
Mason on September 15, 1787, apparently described to
his colleagues in Philadelphia as “that unnecessary (and
15
dangerous) officer the Vice-President.” If one believes
that it is highly desirable to have a designated “presidentin-waiting,” then, at the very least, the selection of the
vice-president should be postponed until the
inauguration of the new president, at which time he or
she would nominate someone, under the procedures set
out in the 25th Amendment, to fill that office upon the
confirmation by both houses of Congress. This would
assure, presumably, at least minimally competent and
experienced vice-presidents in whom the country would
have confidence to take the helm at what would
necessarily be a time of anxiety, in contrast to, say, Spiro
Agnew, Dan Quayle, Sarah Palin, or, for that matter,
Geraldine Ferraro or John Edwards. Those members of
Congress who debated the all-too-rarely-studied Twelfth
Amendment recognized that changing the basic way that
we elected the President and Vice-President—i.e., to
create two “separate tracks” that involved a de facto
recognition of the creation of a party system with a
primary candidate running for the presidency and a
“running mate” who would get the number two office—
would create a great incentive for the presidential
candidate to choose a running mate not on the basis of
who would be best for the country, but, rather, who
might help provide key votes to win the election itself.
Such skeptics were, of course, entirely correct. Perhaps
we should count ourselves lucky in the number of
competent vice presidents we have had, but there is no
reason to rely on such luck (anymore than we should rely
on the electoral college always producing a majority
winner). I would also allow for votes of no confidence in
congressionally-confirmed vice-presidents. Just consider
Dick Cheney, after all, who on paper represented an
altogether plausible choice by George W. Bush in 2000.
Whatever reasons there might be to reject a “no15. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 639 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile
=show.hp%3Ftitle=1786&layout=html#chapter_96199.

!!!LEVINSON-273-SOMUCHTOREWRITE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

SO MUCH TO REWRITE

11/17/2011 2:29 PM

525

confidence” vote in the President scarcely seem
applicable to the Vice-President, who, notoriously, has
no constitutionally assigned responsibilities other than to
serve as President of the Senate.
6. My rewritten Constitution would address the subject of
“emergency powers” in a way that is simply lacking in
the current document. Almost every other contemporary
constitution provides a better model than does our own.
We might study with special care, for example, the South
African Constitution. In any event, we should realize that
suspension of habeas corpus, however relevant to
invasions or insurrections, is really likely to be quite
beside the point with regard to economic emergencies,
16
natural disasters, or pandemics.
7. Finally, I would rewrite the Constitution to allow a
significantly easier amendment process. I would also
spell out some of the procedures for a new convention,
inasmuch as the Framers were almost criminally
negligent in this regard. I would, for example, select
delegates to the convention by a national lottery among
the voting-eligible citizenry, minimally stratified to make
sure of regional diversity. They would be paid, for up to
two years, the salaries received by senators, with
guaranteed sufficient funding to hold hearings literally all
over the world, as well as all over the United States, of
course, on the issues they would necessarily confront.
One consequence of the near-draconian Article V, which
makes it functionally impossible to amend the
Constitution with regard to any half-way controversial
issue (especially if it negatively affects even thirteen of
the fifty states), is that it serves to make symposia like
this appear to most people like a pointless academic
exercise rather than a serious discussion about truly
possible changes.
These by no means conclude my possible list of potential
changes in our Constitution. Would we really wish to retain the
bar on naturalized citizens from becoming President, or require
newly naturalized citizens to wait seven and nine years,
respectively, before being eligible to serve in the House or the
16. See generally, Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Dictatorship:
Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010).
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Senate? Do we necessarily want to continue the bar on members
of Congress serving in the Executive Branch, or to continue to
require every member of the House of Representatives to face a
re-election campaign that increasingly begins almost literally
within a year or so of taking the oath of office? (Perhaps we
could have four-year staggered terms, with half of the House
facing re-election in each election cycle.) The topics of discussion
are almost literally endless.
But I take it that I have given an adequate taste of the kinds
of inquiries that I believe are vitally important for law professors
to initiate not only among themselves—i.e., the readers of
Constitutional Commentary—but also, and more importantly,
among their students. In any event, I am deeply grateful to
Professor Hasday and the editors of Constitutional Commentary
for organizing this symposium, which I, at least, view as an act of
high citizenship and not merely a form of academic entertainment.

